Army Insights from Ukraine Conflict: Key Learnings Regarding Mass-Scale Military Operations
The US Army is facing a critical need to adapt its concepts and doctrine to better prepare for nonlinear and noncontiguous operations, a lesson vividly demonstrated by the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Over the past four months, the Russian military has employed a mix of forces in a nonlinear and noncontiguous strategy, with rapid and deep thrusts along roads aimed at key cities and objectives, and the use of helicopter assaults to seize key locations, primarily airports. This approach, often referred to as hybrid operations, is not adequately addressed in US Army doctrine.
The Ukrainian armed forces and their people have managed to halt the initial thrust of the invasion and have since regained some of their lost territory. However, the US Army's insufficient experience in large-scale operations over time and distance means it may not perform considerably better than the Russians have in Ukraine.
Current US Army doctrine, as outlined in Army Techniques Publication 3-92 and FM 3-0, provides little guidance for nonlinear or noncontiguous operations. Army Training and Leader Development must prepare commanders, staffs, units, and soldiers to operate in a nonlinear and noncontiguous environment and succeed in their missions.
The military intelligence enterprise must also be trained at scale to ensure effective intelligence support of large-scale operations at distance and over time. The US Army's large-unit training, conducted by the Mission Command Training Program during Warfighter Exercises (WFXs), is currently limited to ten-day training sessions in relatively small operational areas.
The logistical system, as detailed in the book On Point: The United States Army in Operations Iraqi Freedom, failed in several areas during the invasion of Iraq. To address this, the Army must invest in improving its logistical capabilities for extended operations.
Military training centres, war colleges, and defence research institutions have focused on the training and simulation of large-scale operations over long distances and extended time periods in recent years. This focus should inform both near-term readiness and future force design across the DOTMLPF spectrum.
As the war in Ukraine continues, it is clear that the eventual outcome is far from certain. However, the US Army must identify major lessons regarding the conduct of large-scale combat operations on the modern battlefield to ensure it is prepared for a variety of future operational environments, missions, and threats. A cultural change may be required, assuming that all future operations will be hybrid in nature.
In conclusion, the US Army must adapt its concepts and doctrine to better enable the Army and the joint force to engage in noncontiguous and nonlinear operations. This will require a shift in training and leader development, a focus on improving logistical capabilities, and a renewed emphasis on nonlinear operations in military exercises and simulations.
