Maritime Sabotage Revisited: Its Place in Strategic Contests
The US Department of Defense (DoD) has expanded its lexicon and command structure to encompass space and cyberspace over the past two decades. However, a recent study did not identify any instances of cross-domain sabotage involving these new domains. This article explores the history and implications of maritime sabotage, a tactic that has played a significant role in military conflict.
Maritime sabotage has a rich history, particularly during World War II, when nearly half of the identified instances in a study occurred. One notable example is the "coal torpedo," a weapon designed by Confederate agent Thomas Courtenay in 1863 to sabotage Union steamships. The effectiveness of the coal torpedo, however, remains inconclusive due to the destruction of Confederate records at the end of the war.
The attempted German sabotage campaign against the United States during World War II also offers a cautionary tale. Several saboteurs turned themselves in to American authorities, resulting in the failure of the operation.
In recent years, the focus of the organization most likely to engage in sabotage, NATO, has shifted from land-based counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations to renewed interest in sabotage, with limited maritime sabotage operations so far.
The Center for Naval Analyses has examined past instances of maritime sabotage to inform policymakers, practitioners, and researchers. A recent report, "Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition," published in October 2021, provides valuable insights.
Sabotage is defined in this analysis as a mission to secretly disarm, obstruct, or destroy enemy war materiel or infrastructure for military advantage. In most maritime sabotage instances, the force employed was composed of SOF or SOF-like personnel.
Today, the US military is shifting priorities from counterterrorism to strategic competition, causing SOF to rebalance their focus to counter violent extremist organizations and compete with peer and near-peer actors. This shift presents an opportunity to consider the role of sabotage in today's environment and during periods of outright hostilities.
The DoD should consider potential benefits, risks, and authorities for conducting such operations. Additionally, policymakers should consider how to leverage maritime assets in support of sabotage across domains, as cross-domain activities like those at the nexus of maritime and cyberspace will present great challenges and opportunities for the joint force in the future.
Alexander Powell, an expert on SOF, terrorist group tactics, and counterterrorism, is among those who have worked extensively on security issues in Afghanistan. His work, along with that of Elizabeth Yang, Annaleah Westerhaug, and Kaia Haney, contributes to the ongoing discussion about the role of sabotage in modern warfare.
In 2020, strategic sabotage was listed as a priority research topic for the Joint Special Operations University, indicating a growing recognition of its importance. As the US DoD continues to adapt to a complex and evolving global security landscape, the study of maritime sabotage and its potential applications will undoubtedly remain relevant.
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