US Military Intervention Post-Afghanistan: Examining the Role of Security Forces Following the Conclusion of America's Strategic Recess

In the wake of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the hegemonic power, shaping global norms with a focus on democratic promotion and support for free markets and human rights. However, the strategic landscape has evolved significantly, with growing assertiveness from China and Russia leading to contested regions across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

The competition between these powers is now taking place indirectly, through providing military aid, advisors, and information warfare. The United States, in response, is furthering the agenda of strategic competition against China and Russia. This competition will hinge heavily on Security Force Assistance (SFA) going forward.

Effective SFA must be adapted to the realities of increasing numbers of partners that lack the political will to sustain high-capability forces and do not fully share US political interests. The US framework for SFA is complex and provides opportunities for adversaries to exploit its weaknesses. Reckless state-building endeavors, directionless counterinsurgency operations, expansive and ill-defined counterterrorism missions, and elaborate SFA programs are becoming a strategic liability.

The Pentagon significantly scaled back its military presence in Africa in 2018 due to congressional blowback from the deaths of four US Army Special Forces soldiers in a 2017 ambush while on patrol with Nigerien security forces. Almost all in-person advising with Afghan forces ceased in 2020 due to COVID-19. These events underscore the need for the US to get SFA right in the twenty-first century.

The Biden administration is aware of this necessity, emphasising that SFA should not be undertaken unless the potential strategic gains outweigh the risk. US political leaders must be able to articulate how and why a particular SFA mission serves US national interests. SFA should often not be embedded in missions such as stability operations, reconstruction, or broad state-building, nor should it try to implant replicas of Western norms in places that lack a social base or popular demand for them.

Research demonstrates that gender equality and diversity reduce the likelihood of civil war, but an emphasis on this issue in a strategic partnership can clash with the broader advance of US national interests. Ideas and values do matter in defining national interests, but for SFA, that means weighing the risks and benefits when assessing whether the United States should engage with a potential partner.

The shift to "virtual military advising" did not work effectively, as partner forces would evasively engage in "performative behaviors" during video calls. In contrast, the deep involvement of two US ambassadors, John Hirsch and Joseph Melrose, was critical in rebuilding the government and security forces of Sierra Leone after its civil war ended in 2002.

The United States supports Ukraine and Taiwan as strategic partners in its broader competition against Russia and China. It supports Ukraine against Russian aggression and provides Taiwan with economic cooperation and military aid while maintaining strategic ambiguity to deter Chinese aggression. However, these interventions have not always been without consequence, as seen in Somalia where there were no existential consequences for American strategic hubris and failures with interventions.

Indirect approaches matter, as US rivals have learned to engage in places like Yemen and Syria, across the Indo-Pacific region, and in Africa to achieve gains without facing a harsh American military response. Iranian and Russian military advisors continued working alongside pro-Assad military forces in Syria regardless of COVID-19 dangers. Many advisory missions to Africa and the Middle East were canceled due to COVID-19 concerns in 2020.

Gains from SFA must be understood in nuanced, comparative terms. SFA should be measured not just by military victories, but also by the long-term stability and democratic development of the partner nations. The United States needs to confront a gigantic bureaucracy and change a culture rooted in the way things have been done in a very different strategic environment.

In conclusion, the future of SFA is crucial in shaping the United States' role in global affairs. The US must adapt its SFA strategies to the new geopolitical realities, focusing on strategic gains, and avoiding reckless interventions that could lead to unintended consequences.